How the Chinese “trapped” the air force wing commander–spy

The 54-year-old Wing Commander of the Hellenic Air Force appeared before the Investigating Judge at the Air Force Court to give his testimony, at a time when he is facing a heavy indictment and the severe penalties it entails. Greece’s National Intelligence Service (EYP) and the Hellenic National Defence General Staff (GEETHA), acting on information received from the CIA since last October, had been monitoring the disgraced Wing Commander and commander of the 128th Telecommunications and Electronic Warfare Squadron (128 SETI) in Kavouri, who, in exchange for payment, was selling classified telecommunications information as well as digital and electronic applications and systems to China.
During his interrogation, the arrested senior officer “broke down” and confessed everything, even naming the Chinese “handler” who was controlling him and who is based in China. He stated, of course, the “name” under which the Chinese agent introduced himself — “Steven”, supposedly for ease of communication — but it is clearly a name of no real value, equivalent to “Nobody”, as spies commonly use.

The authorities have, however, managed to identify his real identity and have confirmed that he is indeed an officer of China’s intelligence services.

Contacts with the Chinese

Their first contact was made online, after the Wing Commander had uploaded a detailed CV on LinkedIn. This led to the initial approach by the Chinese operative, posing as a representative of a technology company who claimed to be impressed by the Greek officer’s expertise. He initially assigned him a number of studies for the company’s website, which in reality served as a “front” for this particular operation by China’s intelligence services.
The Hellenic Air Force officer even began learning the Chinese language. During their in-person meeting in China, which took place during a private trip that he failed to report to his service, a Chinese woman also appeared, using a supposedly American name, whom he never saw again. At that point, his “handler” admitted that he was working for the Chinese state.

In the case of the woman, the authorities believe she may have been senior to the “handler” and wanted to be present at the first meeting, or that she appeared as a “honey trap”, as the espionage term goes.
When they realised that he was not interested in anything of that sort, but only in recognition of the level of his knowledge and expertise, they simply followed that path, praising his skills and value — something that satisfied him immensely.

He came to trust them and, gradually, after receiving a mobile phone with encrypted software, he began, in exchange for payment, to send the classified and secret plans that the Chinese wanted to obtain, affecting not only national defence but NATO as a whole.

He was paid according to the value of the information he passed on to his “handler”, with large payments made when what he provided was indeed of significant value and not already known to them.

No one yet knows the full extent of his financial gain, as for obvious reasons the officer has not disclosed the credentials of his crypto account through which he received the transfers. However, he made gradual cash withdrawals that reached €5,000 per month and, over a three-month period, €15,000–€20,000, in an overall operation that lasted approximately 18 months.