Recruitment of the spy wing commander began on LinkedIn – He sent onformation via QR codes

New details are coming to light regarding the activities of the Hellenic Air Force wing commander who was arrested for espionage and is accused of selling classified information on telecommunications and digital applications to China.

The 54-year-old officer, commander of the 128th Telecommunications and Electronics Training Squadron of the Hellenic Air Force in Kavouri, had an outstanding résumé, extensive experience, and a high level of technical expertise. He also held key positions of responsibility and was therefore considered above suspicion.

How the Wing Commander Was Recruited

According to MEGA TV, the wing commander’s recruitment allegedly took place through a job-seeking platform, the well-known LinkedIn. On the platform, he notably stated that he was “seeking challenges.”

There, he had made a series of posts related to his field. Particularly noteworthy is an article he authored himself titled “A Guide for Insiders,” in which he explained that when managing an organization, one must monitor staff to prevent information leaks.

He Worked for China for at Least 18 Months

The next question authorities are raising concerns how long he had been operating as an agent. What is known at this stage is that he had been doing so for at least 18 months.

China, moreover, has been engaged in an expanded effort to obtain critical information related to technology, communications, NATO troop movements, and anything else that could prove useful.

Greece is not the only country where an espionage case has emerged, as similar investigations are underway in several other Western countries. For this reason, the National Intelligence Service (EYP) is also cooperating with other European states.

The Information He Had Access To – How He Transmitted It

Given his rank as a wing commander, the level of classified clearance he held was quite high.

As a result, he had access through his computer using the personal credentials assigned to each corresponding officer.

He would log in from his computer, extract the information he needed, then convert it into QR codes. Using software provided by those who were paying him, he would then transmit the information to China.

What the Chinese Objective Was

China’s objective was to collect any information related to technology as well as military intelligence.

Iran is China’s latest major source of oil.

Therefore, China is interested in learning about any NATO or U.S. troop movements to the region, in addition to acquiring technology of interest in order to replicate it.