Tempi: No safety safeguards – Transport Ministry knew about chronic failures

The Administrative Court of First Instance of Athens delivered a damning ruling against the Ministry of Transport, finding that its omissions contributed to the absence of necessary safety safeguards that could have prevented the Tempi tragedy, awarding €400,000 in compensation to relatives of a victim.

The court published the reasoning of its decision, which granted significant compensation to the family of a passenger on the Intercity train that collided head-on with a freight train. After describing the circumstances of the crash—where 57 people, including 11 employees or subcontractors of Hellenic Train, lost their lives, 81 were seriously injured, and 99 sustained minor injuries—the ruling assigns heavy responsibility to the Ministry of Transport and, by extension, the Greek state.

Acknowledging that “the Greek State, through the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, and the Railway Regulatory Authority (RAS), exercise supervisory powers over OSE,” the court stressed that “the Greek State, through the Ministry, exercised its supervisory responsibilities in railway safety in a deficient manner and, through this unlawful omission, causally contributed to the damaging outcome, which could have been prevented.”

It also noted that “given the lack of remote control systems, signaling, and ETCS on the specific route, the (inexperienced) station master, who was alone on duty, made successive traffic management errors, the fatal consequences of which could not ultimately be avoided due to the absence of these safety safeguards. As established, proper safety systems had not been functioning for a long period prior to the accident—systems which are designed to prevent accidents caused by human error.”

Ministry knew about chronic failures

According to the court, the Ministry of Transport was aware of long-standing malfunctions in safety systems, the lack of modern systems capable of preventing accidents due to human error, and insufficient supervision by RAS—factors that led to the railway collision of 28 February 2023.

The court rejected the state’s claims that responsibility lay solely with OSE and RAS, noting instead a shared liability of the state.

It also cited statements by railway workers’ unions warning about safety deficiencies, risks, and the need for measures to protect both workers and passengers.

Key factors behind the accident

The court identified specific contributing factors, particularly the absence of signaling and remote control:

“If signaling lights had been operational, train drivers would have stopped upon seeing a red signal, preventing the collision.”
Because signaling systems were not functioning, drivers relied solely on station master instructions, creating a constant safety risk.
“If remote control had existed, there would have been a second level of oversight, significantly increasing safety.”

It added that track occupancy control systems and signaling are essential for traffic supervision and form the backbone of the European Train Control System (ETCS). On the section from Larissa to Neoi Poroi, although these systems were installed, they were not operational.

As a result, the Larissa Traffic Control Center was also non-functional, meaning there was no central operator to supervise the station master or intervene in case of error. These safeguards could have corrected the initial mistake and prevented the fatal outcome.

“In such a system, signaling would also be active, and it would never be possible for two trains to be routed onto the same track,” the ruling states.

Questions over RAS capacity

Regarding RAS, the judges noted that inspections by the European Union Agency for Railways in 2019 and 2022 had already identified concerns about its ability to effectively carry out its supervisory role.

At the time of the accident, RAS was understaffed, with only 16 employees, including just eight engineers. The court noted that such a small team could not realistically possess the full technical expertise required to oversee a complex system like the railway network.

This imbalance between responsibilities and available staff resulted in insufficient supervision and an inability to identify major safety compliance failures—further highlighting the need for functioning safety systems capable of preventing accidents regardless of human error.

Jurisdiction over OSE and Hellenic Train

Finally, the court dismissed the part of the case concerning OSE and Hellenic Train, stating that as private law entities, they fall under the jurisdiction of civil courts.

It clarified that train drivers are employed by Hellenic Train, while infrastructure personnel such as station masters belong to OSE. Therefore, claims against OSE must be brought before civil courts, while claims against the Greek state fall under administrative court jurisdiction and can proceed on their merits.